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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
POWER OF A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION TO ENTER
INTO A CHECK-OFF AGREEMENT WITH
A LABOR UNION
Mugford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltiinore'
This was a bill in equity brought by the taxpayers to
enjoin and restrain the performance of an agreement be!
tween the City of Baltimore, entered into on its behalf by
the Department of Public Works of the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore, and the Municipal Chauffeurs, Help-
ers and Garage Employees Union No. 825 (A. F. L.). The
agreement provided, in substance, for automatic payroll
deductions covering union dues. The bill of complaint
contained four prayers: (1) That the agreement be de-
clared null and void, (2) that the defendants be enjoined
and restrained from giving preferential treatment to the
union or its officers, (3) that the defendants be enjoined
and restrained from making any payroll deductions for
payment of union dues, and (4) for such further relief as
the case required. The trial court granted the first two
prayers, but denied the other two. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the rulings of the lower court.
For proper understanding and comment upon this deci-
sion, it is necessary to look briefly into the nature of the
check-off system, and to trace the background of this par-
ticular case.
Under a "check-off" system, union dues or other fees
are regularly deducted from an employee's pay by his em-
ployer, to facilitate the union's making such collections.
The employee may either voluntarily authorize such de-
ductions, or general provision for it may be included in a
management-labor union agreement. U
The check-off system, in general, if "voluntary" on both
sides, is not in itself legally objectionable, either in the
light of the law prior to the N. L. R. A., or that since.2 It
1 185 Md. 266, 44 A. 2d 745 (1945).
See, DANGEL AND SHMBSER, THE LAW OF LABOR UNIONS, (1941) 4, 5.
Where there is not a closed shop, deductions under union agreements are,
of course, only made in the case of members of those unions which have the
check-off system in their labor con-tracts with the employer.
See, 135 A. L. R. 507, citing specifically N. L. R. B. v. West Kentucky
Coal Company, 110 F. 2d 984 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) ; N. L. R. B. v. J. Greene-
baum Tanning Company, 110 F. 2d 984 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940); Gasaway v.
Borderland Coal Corporation, 278 F. 56 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921). See also
Borderland Coal Corporation v. International United Mine Workers, 275
F. 871, 873 (D. Inc. 1921), where check-off apparently was enjoined only
because the money thus collected was used for an unlawful purpose. See
also, 29 U. S. C. A. (1947) sec. 186.
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is true that the Railway Labor Act of of 1934,3 prohibiting
the check-off system in the case of carriers and certain
other employer-employee relationships,' was held constitu-
tional; and, presumably in the absence of a specific state
statute, this system would not per se be unconstitutional.5
The question of whether a municipal corporation, as
distinguished from a private corporation, may enter into a
check-off agreement with a labor union, has confronted the
courts' in but few instances. It must be remembered that
municipalities obtain their powers under charters from
state legislatures, so that acts beyond such authority are
ultra vires, and unenforceable.'
In general, legislative or discretionary powers which
the council or governing body of a municipality derive
under law or charter cannot be delegated without express
legislative authority; but functions regarded as purely ad-
ministrative or ministerial may be delegated to subordi-
nates.8
The right to fix wages and hours of municipal employees
is a right generally provided by charter to be vested in the
city government or its departments, usually under some
type of civil service system Entering into a wage-hour
agreement with a labor union can conceivably be held a
surrender of the city's discretionary power under such sub-
jects. For example, a municipal ordinance of the City of
Milwaukee, under which the wages paid to laborers em-
ployed on work done for the city were to be governed by
prevailing wages as determined by those paid members of
any labor organization, subject to the municipal common
8 45 U. S. C. A. (1934) sec. 152.
' Brotherhood of Railroad Shop Crafts v. Lowden, 86 F. 2d 458 (C. C. A.
10th, 1936).
5 Md. Code (1939) Art. 8, Sees. 11-17, limit the assignability of wages
under certain conditions, but do not make such assignment void for all
purposes.
6 It should be noted that the National Labor Relations Act expressly ex-
cludes "any state or political subdivision thereof" from the definition of
"employer", indicating a policy of excluding municipal corporations from
enforced collective bargaining. 29 U. S. C. A. (1935) sec. 152 (2).
7 Hanlon v. Levin, 168 Md. 674, 179 A. 286 (1935) ; Rushe v. Hyattsville,
116 Md. 122, 81 A. 278 (1911) ; Rossberg v. State, 111 Md. 394, 74 A. 581
(1909) ; Baltimore City v. Gahan, 104 Md. 145, 64 A. 716 (1906) ; Librizzi
v. Plunkett, 16 A. 2d 280 (1941) ; Borough of Weatherly v. Warner, 25 A.
2d 831 (Pa. 1942); Shaw v. City and County of San Francisco, 13 Cal.
App. 547, 110 Pac. 149 (1910) ; In re Babcock, 115 App. Div. 191, 101 N. Y. S.
90 (1906); Stewart v. City of Springfield, 165 S. W. 2d 626 (Mo. 1942).
See also Duff and Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari: A
Maxim of American Constitutional Law (1929) 14 Corn. L. Q. 168.
8 M. & C. C. of Baltimore v. Wollman, 123 Md. 310, 91 A. 339 (1914).
See, Charter and Pub. Loc. L. of Baltimore City (1938) secs. 268-284,
relating to the Merit System (City Service Commission).
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council, was held to be void as a surrender by the common
council of its right to exercise judgment in the matter;
and an agreerhent under which the council would be bound
by wage scales which labor unions would be in a position
to determine.10
In a comment written shortly after the 1939 unification
of transit facilities in New York City under municipal
ownership, it was concluded that "the validity of the as-
sumption of the collective (bargaining) agreement is quite
doubtful, in that it appears to constitute an unauthorized
limitation of the discretion required to be exercised by
"[the municipal agency]"."
A case close in point is the recent City of Cleveland v.
Division 268, Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric
Railway and Motor Coach Employees of America.2 There,
the City of Cleveland had authority, under the Ohio Con-
stitution, to operate a street railway system. The city
charter authorized the Transit Board to manage a system,
and establish wages and working conditions. An action for
a declaratory judgment was brought to test the power of
the Board to enter into a collective bargaining agreement
with a union. The Court held that the Board would be
illegally delegating legislative authority by entering into
such a contract, surrendering (without right to do so) its
continuing discretionary power. Furthermore, recognizing
a union as a sole bargaining agent would be discriminatory
to non-union employees. It will be noted that, while the
question here involved was one relating to a proprietary
function, the Court propounded, by way of strong dicta, the
ruling that this case would be followed even where a
proprietary function was not involved.13
The Court of Appeals of Maryland was faced with the
problem in the present case." The Court approved the
relief granted the taxpayer in holding void an agreement
by the City with a labor union, on the basis that the City,
in recognizing a union as the collective bargaining agency
for certain municipal employees, would have delegated or
abdicated its power of continuing discretion. The Court
pointed out that, to the extent that hours, wages and work-
"' Wagner v. City of Milwaukee, 177 Wis. 410, 188 N. W. 487 (1922).
21 Note, Labor Law--Right of Municipality to Enter into Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement on Behalf of Civil Service Employee8 (1941) 18 N. Y. U.
L. Q. Rev. 247, 260.
"s30 Ohio Op. 395 (1945).
10 See, Note, Municipal Corporationv8-Collective Bargaining Contract8-
Implied Power to Bargain with a Labor Union. (1946) 44 Mich. L. R. 664, 5.
11 Supra, n. 1.
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ing conditions "are covered by provisions of the City Char-
ter, creating a budgetary system and a civil service, those
provisions of law are controlling." Even when left to
departmental determination, the City may not delegate its
continuing discretion. The proper exercise of that discre-
tion includes the right to change hours, wages and work-
ing conditions, and entry into agreement with a labor union
on such subjects would be in contravention to that discre-
tion.
The Court further pointed out that while a member of
a labor union cannot be barred from public service 15 be-
cause of such membership, a municipality may not, on the
other hand, discriminate in favor of members of labor
unions. It might readily be argued that an agreement by
a municipality with a labor union would tend to discrimi-
nate in favor of union members as against other municipal
employees.
However, the precise matter on appeal in the Mugford
case was the allowance by the trial Court of check-off of
union dues where individual union members "voluntarily"
requested it, though a general check-off of all union mem-
bers' dues was enjoined. The Court of Appeals looked with
approval upon this distinction, regarding the permitted de-
ductions upon an individual's request in the same light as
deductions made at the request of employees for war bonds
and charitable funds.16
In this decision, it is submitted that the Court of Ap-
peals was exemplifying a familiar trend in judicial history,
of standing by the guns of earlier decisions while not al-
lowing these embattlements to become a hindrance to
"social changes." While the principle remains, the applica-
tion is altered to recognize a modified form of collective
bargaining by a municipality. While a city government
cannot delegate its charter-granted powers, and relinquish
its discretionary control over the wages, hours and work-
ing conditions of its employees, it may voluntarily agree to
make deductions of union items from employees' pay upon
the voluntary application therefor by those union em-
ployees who request such action.
"I Raney v. Montgomery County, 170 Md. 183, 197, 183 A. 548, 554 (1936);
cited in Mugford v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, supra, n. 1.
16 It is perhaps possible to draw a contrary conclusion from the case of
Hughes v. Svboda, 168 Md. 440, 178 A. 108 (1935), noted (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev.
172, in which the Court refused to allow a public officer or public institu-
tion to be subject to garnishment as to funds of a prisoner which were
taken from him at the time of his incarceration. This might be an indica-
tion of public policy which would reflect against public collection of union
dues.
1948]
